Deflationist views in ontology and metaontology (devionme) Excelencia 2020

This new project addresses deflationism in ontology and metaontology. Deflationist positions, in general, reject that disputes about a given issue have any substantive significance. Metaontological deflationism rejects that metaphysical disputes about the existence and nature of entities of any kind are substantial. Ontological deflationism claims the same about the notions of existence and object.

1. We will try to determine the relations between three different sorts of deflationism, the two mentioned above and semantic deflationism. Thomasson (2014) claims that ontological deflationism implies (logically) or, at least, entails (analytically) metaontological deflationism; that the three form a coherent pack; that the semantic implies the ontological, and the ontological the metaontological. We will be arguing that metaontological deflationism does not necessarily imply semantic deflationism, although it probably does presuppose deflationism with respect to the notion of existence; contrary to what 

   Thomasson seems to assume, ontological deflationism does not imply metaontological deflationism (cf. Marschall and Schindler 2020).

2. We will contend that metaontological deflationism is compatible with Carnapian pragmatism for external questions, and allows for granting extracognitive value to traditional metaphysical disputes, without turning these into mere verbal disputes.
3. We will also discuss deflationist proposals-or close to it- (Hirsch, Rayo, Linnebo, Balaguer, Bueno, Thomasson, Hofweber, Azzouni, etc.) to put forward the differences between them; to determine to what extent they can be considered as neo-Carnapian; to see whether any of them combines with certain naturalistic attitude. We will advocate that there are substantial differences between the views considered; that not all of them can be strictly called neo-Carnapian; and that at least some of these deflationary proposals in ontology/metaontology are likely to be combined with a naturalistic posture.
4. We will try to identify a series of features that allow us to characterize ontological deflationism, in the line to what Armour-Garb has done in relation to semantic deflationism. One major issue will be to see what counts as a deflationary understanding of the relation between existence and the quantifiers. Both neo-Carnapian and neo-Quinean views, seem to agree on the Quinean dictum. Now, since new- Quineans are not deflationists about existence, while neo-Carnapians are, accepting the dictum seems not to decide. It might be the case that its acceptance is one of the features of deflationism about existence. However, there are metaontological proposals that are deflationary that reject Quines dictum. Accepting the dictum conveys accepting a traditional reading of the existential quantifier. But the relation between the existential quantifier and existence is far from clear.
5. We will be assessing Cumpa and Bueno's neutralism, Zaltas neo-Meinongianism, or Azzouni's deflationary metaphysics. These proposals separate the existential quantifier and existential commitment and advocate a neutral reading of quantifiers. Bueno & Cumpa (2020) argue that neutralism leads us to adopt a more appropriate and defensible metaontological conception than Thomasson's easy- ontology and metaontological deflationism. We will also be analyzing the interplay between existence, quantifiers and modal operators and the associated notion of merely possible object (Williamson 2013).